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Abstract
In a publicly financed health system, it is important that priority-setting reflects 
social values. Many studies investigate public preferences through surveys taken 
from samples, but to be representative, these samples must reflect value judgments 
of all relevant population subgroups. In this study, we explore whether, next to bet-
ter-understood sources of heterogeneity such as age, education or gender, also differ-
ences in personality play a role in how people want to set limits to health care. We 
investigate the influence of dispositional optimism: whether someone anticipates a 
good or bad future. This is an important personality dimension that has been shown 
to widely reverberate into people’s lives and that can also be expected to influence 
people’s views on health care. To test our hypothesis, we asked a representative 
sample of the Belgian population (N = 750) to complete both the revised life orien-
tation test and a discrete choice experiment about allocating healthcare resources, 
and we investigated the relationships between both measurements. We found that 
more pessimistic individuals were less supportive of using patients’ age as a selec-
tion criterion and more hesitant to invest in prevention. Since individual dispositions 
are usually not part of the criteria for selecting representative samples, our findings 
point at a potential non-response bias in studies that elicit social values.
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Introduction
Health policy decision-makers with limited budgets unavoidably have to set prior-
ities over different healthcare interventions (Daniels & Sabin, 2008). These deci-
sions imply several complex trade-offs. For instance, deeply grained intuitions to 
‘rescue’ individual, identifiable patients need to be reconciled with more calcu-
lated, utilitarian approaches that focus on cost-effectiveness, maximizing health 
at the population level. A judgment needs to be made about which illness is more 
severe, e.g. comparing physical with mental illness. A decision is needed about 
whether there is a role for personal characteristics of patients such as how old 
a patient is or whether she has taken good care of her health in the past (Olsen, 
Richardson, Dolan, & Menzel, 2003). A balance must be struck between invest-
ing resources in prevention versus in treatment (Faust & Menzel, 2012). The 
common element in these questions is that they require value judgments. There 
is no obvious right or wrong way to make these decisions, and reasonable people 
can disagree in their answers.
Therefore, many think that there is an important role for the preferences and 
values of the population in setting limits to public health care. An extensive body 
of research has emerged describing how people make trade-offs and set priorities 
[for reviews, see (Schwappach, 2002; Dolan, Shaw, Tsuchiya, & Williams, 2005; 
Shah, 2009; Gu, Lancsar, Ghijben, Butler, & Donaldson, 2015)]. In the UK, the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) regularly organizes 
‘Citizens Councils’ to formulate policy guidance with respect to social values in 
health care (NICE, 2008). In Belgium, the Federal Healthcare Knowledge Cen-
tre recruited a large group of volunteers to develop ‘citizen labs’ to answer the 
dilemmas of healthcare rationing (Cleemput, 2014; Standaard, 2014). Similar 
examples can be found for many other countries, including Canada, the Nether-
lands or Australia (Mooney & Blackwell, 2004; OMHLTC, 2013). The values that 
emerge from these studies are increasingly used to assist decision-makers in pri-
ority-setting, e.g. in reimbursement decisions. They can be used in a deliberative 
approach, considering evidence on social values next to other pieces of informa-
tion (such as medical or economic evidence) or in more algorithmic approaches 
where social value judgments are quantified, e.g. in the form of equity weights or 
inequality aversion estimates, which can explicitly be incorporated into decision 
models (e.g. in a distributive cost-effectiveness analysis) [see e.g. (Lancsar, Wild-
man, Donaldson, Ryan, & Baker, 2011; Asaria, Griffin, & Cookson, 2016; Cook-
son, Ali, Tsuchiya, & Asaria, 2018)].
The validity of these studies claiming to elicit the social values of a popula-
tion depends on the representativeness of the samples used in the study. Usually, 
sample representativeness is assessed in terms of age, gender, educational attain-
ment, geographical spread and perhaps a few other socio-demographic variables. 
However, also differences in less visible characteristics can be important. One 
of these is someone’s personality. The role of personality traits in shaping how 
people think, feel and behave has long been recognized in the field of psychol-
ogy (Corr & Matthews, 2009). Personality traits have been linked to a substantial 
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series of important life outcomes, including marital status, occupational attain-
ment and even mortality [e.g. (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 
2007)]. If personality influences how someone makes the value judgments inher-
ent to priority-setting, then this has implications for the representativeness of 
studies that infer social values from (often online) samples of volunteers. These 
studies might attract particular personality types, leading to social values that are 
not necessarily representative of a population. Indeed, research has shown that 
particular personality types are more likely to participate in survey research than 
others, leading to significant non-response bias (Marcus & Schutz, 2005; Smith, 
Edens, Epstein, Stiles, & Poythress, 2012). For instance, one study found that 
non-responders to survey research were less agreeable, less extravert, had a lower 
openness to experience and lower narcissism than volunteers in both self- and 
observer ratings (Marcus & Schutz, 2005).
In this study, we explore the effect on preferences for priority-setting of one 
well-known personality difference between individuals: whether someone generally 
expects to have a good or a bad future. This difference is coined ‘dispositional opti-
mism’ in the psychology literature, and there are strong reasons to believe that it 
matters to people’s views on health care (see “Dispositional Optimism” section). We 
added an established instrument to measure dispositional optimism, the revised life 
orientation test (LOT-R), to a discrete choice experiment (DCE) about priority-set-
ting that was executed in a sample (N = 750) of the general population in Belgium. 
The “Dispositional Optimism” section summarizes the literature on dispositional 
optimism and suggests ways in which this personality dimension can influence pref-
erences for healthcare priority-setting. Next, the “Methods” section describes the 
methods used. Then, the “Results” section presents the results, and finally, the “Dis-
cussion” section assesses the relevance of our findings and provides further points 
for discussion.
Dispositional Optimism
The categorization of individuals in optimists and pessimists is deeply rooted in 
popular culture and folk psychology (e.g. the glass half–full or half–empty meta-
phor) (Carver & Scheier, 2014). In previous decades, it has become the subject of 
extensive scientific research, mainly through the development of the life orientation 
test (LOT), a self-report measure of optimism and pessimism, which was revised in 
1994 (LOT-R) (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). This 
body of research resolves that ‘dispositional optimism’ is a personality trait, which 
remains relatively stable over one’s lifespan, provided it is not substantially manipu-
lated or exposed to disruptive life changes (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010). 
There is converging evidence that optimism has a neurobiological basis, with pes-
simistic and optimistic views being primarily determined by higher activity in the 
right and the left cerebral hemisphere (Hecht, 2013). Moreover, studies that inves-
tigate the genetic origins of dispositional optimism find heritability estimates of 
20–30% (Mosing et  al. 2009; Rius-Ottenheim et  al. 2012a, b). However, nurture 
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matters too with for instance higher socio-economic status in childhood being pre-
dictive of a more optimistic nature in adulthood (Heinonen et al. 2006).
There is ample evidence that dispositional optimism strongly affects our mental, 
physical, economic and social state (Carver et al. 2010; Hecht, 2013). Optimism is 
associated with increased protection against stroke (Kim, Park, & Peterson 2011), 
carotid artery blockage (Matthews, Raikkonen, Sutton-Tyrrell, & Kuller, 2004) and 
rehospitalization after coronary artery bypass grafting (Tindle et al. 2009) and yields 
better immune responses (Segerstrom, 2007). One study followed a cohort of 95,000 
healthy women and found that more optimistic individuals are less likely to develop 
coronary heart disease (CHD) or die from CHD-related causes or any cause over 
an 8-year period (Tindle et al. 2009). Optimists are also less likely to smoke, more 
likely to exercise and have more healthy diets (Carver & Scheier, 2014). Further-
more, outside of the health domain, optimism is also associated with better socio-
economic outcomes. More optimistic students (measured before starting higher edu-
cation) have lower dropout rates in their college years (Nes, Evans, & Segerstrom, 
2009) and later earn more than their less optimistic counterparts (Segerstrom, 2007). 
Also, optimists indicate greater satisfaction in their romantic relationships, and so 
do their partners (Srivastava, McGonigal, Richards, Butler, & Gross, 2006). They 
have a broader social network (Andersson, 2012) and are more resilient towards 
developing loneliness late in life (Rius-Ottenheim et al. 2012a, b). They even invest 
in different stock portfolios (Puri & Robinson, 2007) and make different financial 
and accounting decisions as managers (Heaton, 2002). One study suggests that opti-
mists are also more vulnerable to problematic gambling behaviour (Gibson & San-
bonmatsu, 2004). Issues of reverse causation (that success determines optimism and 
not vice versa) and unmeasured confounding (that both optimism and success are 
caused by an omitted variable) cannot be fully ruled out in these studies due to their 
observational nature and often relatively short follow-up periods. However, many 
studies use extensive strategies to mitigate these issues and are confident that the 
causal relationship runs (at least partly) from optimism to the variable under study.
An explanation for the more positive outcomes associated with optimism is that 
optimists and pessimists are fundamentally different in their problem-solving attitude 
(Carver et al. 2010; Hecht, 2013). Optimism is shown to be associated with more effi-
cient scanning for risks, more effective coping with adversity and taking a more proac-
tive approach in confronting possible problems. The mechanism behind this difference 
in attitude, it is argued, operates mainly through differences between optimists and pes-
simists in their motivation for reaching objectives (Carver & Scheier, 2014). Optimists 
are more confident that goals (small or big ones) are achievable, see fewer impediments 
and therefore do more effort, whereas pessimists easier disengage. This attitudinal dif-
ference reverberates into different degrees of dedication to goals, more experience in 
reaching these goals, which will in turn reinforce motivation and become a source of 
support in achieving new goals or coping with adversity. Moreover, research shows that 
in the simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals, where trade-offs in investing effort are 
needed, optimists also do better in allocating more effort to high-priority goals and dis-
engaging from either low-priority goals or goals with unfavourable odds (Segerstrom, 
2007; Geers, Wellman, & Lassiter 2009; Geers, Wellman, Seligman, Wuyek, & Neff, 
2010; Pavlova & Silbereisen, 2013). There is also a relationship between optimism 
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and time preference. Although both are related concepts, optimism deals with some-
one’s valuing of positive or negative future events, whereas time preference readjusts 
this value for distance in time with events further ahead receiving a lower value than 
more proximate events. Research has investigated the link between these two concepts 
and has found that higher levels of optimism are associated with higher discounting 
for time preference (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2001). The underlying mechanism, it 
is argued, is that optimists are keener on immediate gains because they are optimistic 
that these gains will be followed by additional gains, whereas they are keener to delay 
losses because they are more confident that these will be avoidable in future.
Based on the literature described above, we hypothesized that dispositional opti-
mism can also be an important driver of how people approach the problem of setting 
limits to health care. More specifically, we expect dispositional optimism to influence 
(1) the extent to which individuals value prevention over treatment, (2) the extent to 
which they take into account the known effectiveness of an intervention, (3) their val-
uation of health gains occurring in distant versus proximal futures (time preference) 
and (4) the extent to which they favour age-based rationing. First, the more proactive 
problem-solving attitude of optimists (Carver et al. 2010; Hecht, 2013) suggests that 
optimists will prefer higher investments in prevention and in avoiding bad outcomes in 
the future rather than paying for a wait-and-treat scenario later on. Observations from 
health behaviour research also show that pessimists are less prevention-oriented when 
it comes to their own health behaviours. Studies have documented this in the context of, 
e.g., preventing heart attacks (Radcliffe & Klein, 2002), taking vitamins, eating low-
fat foods and enrolment in a cardiac rehabilitation programme after a bypass grafting 
(Scheier et al. 1999) and sexual risk-taking behaviour (Taylor et al. 1992). Second, opti-
mists’ easier disengagement from goals with unfavourable odds (Geers et al. 2009) sug-
gests that optimists will set lower priorities for less effective health care, or for health 
care of which the health benefits are more uncertain. Third, the higher levels of time 
discounting of optimists (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2001) suggest that optimists will 
set higher priorities for health care with more immediate benefits. And, finally, as opti-
mists, by definition, expect a better future, they may therefore also anticipate a lower 
need of health care at older age. Research indeed shows that at older age pessimists 
have worse health outcomes than optimists (Carver et al. 2010; Carver & Scheier, 2014) 
and fewer economic and social resources: lower incomes, a smaller social network, 
fewer close relationships and they perceive less social support from their partners, rela-
tives and friends (Brissette, Scheier, & Carver, 2002; Carver, Lehman, & Antoni, 2003; 
Macleod & Conway, 2005), all of which are important sources of health and well-being 
at older age [e.g. (Giles, Glonek, Luszcz, & Andrews, 2005; Sirven & Debrand, 2012). 
This might affect their views on age-based priority-setting.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a large-scale discrete choice experiment 
among a sample of the Belgian population. In the next sections, we summarize our 
study and the answers it gave regarding those hypotheses.
 Social Justice Research
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Methods
Sample
A sample from an online panel of 10,753 Belgians was recruited via a market 
research company of which a total of 3160 individuals (30%) agreed to participate in 
our study. From this group, 750 respondents were retained, by random filling of pre-
determined quota for age, gender, province, rural versus urban spread and level of 
educational attainment. Only participants aged 18–75 years were included. Table 1 
summarizes the sample’s representativeness relative to the Belgian population. All 
these respondents provided answers to the LOT-R and DCE questions.
The Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT‑R)
The standard instrument to measure dispositional optimism is the revised life orien-
tation test (LOT-R) (Scheier et al. 1994). This is a revised version of the earlier life 
orientation test (Scheier & Carver, 1985) and focuses more on the conceptual core of 
the trait (i.e. expectations about one’s future). The scale consists of ten items, three 
of which measure optimism, three measure pessimism and four of which are filler 
items to disguise the underlying purpose of the test (see Fig. 1). Respondents have to 
answer on a Likert scale (in our case, a five-point scale), ranging from ‘strongly disa-
gree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Numerous studies have documented the reliability and the 
validity of the scale, reporting adequate measures of internal consistency, test–retest 
reliability and construct and predictive validity (for a review, see (Carver et al. 2010). 
In empirical studies, test–retest correlations range from 0.58 to 0.79 over periods 
ranging from several weeks, years to more than a decade (Carver et al. 2010).
There is discussion in the literature about whether optimism and pessimism are 
two polar opposites on a one-dimensional continuum (RobinsonWhelen, Kim, Mac-
Callum, & KiecoltGlaser, 1997; Rauch, Schweizer, & Moosbrugger, 2007; Seger-
strom, Evans, & Eisenlohr-Moul, 2011; Chiesi, Galli, Primi, Borgi, & Bonacchi, 
2013) or whether both are two separable dimensions, one pertaining to affirmation 
versus disavowal of optimism and the other to affirmation or disavowal of pessimism 
(Glaesmer et al. 2012). Although virtually all bipolar trait scales that contain both 
positively and negatively framed items typically form two dimensions in factor anal-
yses, for some researchers these statistical grounds are enough to also treat optimism 
and pessimism as two conceptually different dimensions (Carver et al. 2010; Carver 
& Scheier, 2014). Others think the split is a product of method variance in respond-
ing and question the conceptual possibility of people to be pessimistic and optimistic 
at the same time. Studies aimed at settling the issue reached opposite conclusions: 
some claim a unidimensional view is best (RobinsonWhelen et al. 1997; Rauch et al. 
2007; Segerstrom et al. 2011; Chiesi et al. 2013), others claim the two dimensions 
should be treated separately (Glaesmer et al. 2012). To accommodate for these dif-
ferent views and in line with recommendations in the literature (Carver et al. 2010), 
we used three different LOT-R outcomes in our analyses: a total LOT-R score (the 
one-dimensional construct, termed LO henceforth) based on the three optimistic and 
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Table 1  Characteristics of 
the sample relative to those 
of the Belgian population. 
Source Belgian Data: Federale 
Overheidsdienst Economie 
(FOD-economie 2012)
Sample (%) Belgian 
population 
(%)
Language
 Dutch 56 56
 French 44 44
Gender
 Male (M) 50 50
 Female (F) 50 50
Gender per age  groupa
 18–25 M 6 6
 18–25 F 6 6
 25–34 M 9 9
 25–34 F 10 9
 35–44 M 10 11
 35–44 F 10 10
 45–54 M 10 10
 45–54 F 11 10
 55–64 M 9 8
 55–64 F 10 8
 65–74 M 6 6
 65–74 F 4 6
Level of  educationb
 None or primary 8 19
 Lower secondary education 10 20
 Higher secondary education 31 33
 Higher non-university education 35 18
 (Post-)university 15 10
Province
 Antwerp 15 16
 West Flanders 10 11
 East Flanders 13 13
 Limburg 8 8
 Hainault 13 12
 Liege 10 10
 Luxemburg 3 2
 Namur 5 4
 Brussels 10 10
 Flemish Brabant 11 10
 Walloon Brabant 3 3
 Social Justice Research
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the three pessimistic items, and two separate constructs: an optimism score (OPT) 
based only on the three optimistic items and a pessimism score (PES) based on the 
three pessimistic items. To obtain the LO and OPT scores, we summed the scores of 
the items under consideration. To obtain the PES score, we summed the scores of 
the pessimistic items and reversed the scaling so that a high PES score stands for a 
more pessimistic attitude.
Fig. 1  Revised life orientation test (LOT-R)
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
[2. It's easy for me to relax.] 
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
4. I'm always optimistic about my future. 
[5. I enjoy my friends a lot.] 
[6. It's important for me to keep busy.] 
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. 
[8. I don't get upset too easily.] 
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. 
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than 
bad.
Note: Items 2, 5, 6 and 8 are fillers. 
Table 1  (continued)
a Age: the percentages reported are proportions in the selected popu-
lation (18–75), representing 71% of the total Belgian population
b Education: the percentages reported for the Belgian population are 
for the age group 15 years or older. The percentages for our sample 
are only for the age group between 18 and 75 years. The overrepre-
sentation of higher educated respondents in our sample as compared 
to the total population can be explained by our exclusion of the age 
group between 15 and 18 years that is too young for higher educa-
tion, and the age group 75 years or older for which higher education 
was less democratically accessible
c Smoking percentages from the population are based upon the study 
(SIPH 2008) and are representative of the population aged 15 years 
or older
Sample (%) Belgian 
population 
(%)
Smoking  statusc
 Never smoked 45 54
 Ex-smoker 30 22
 Smoker 25 25
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Discrete Choice Experiment on Priority‑Setting
DCEs are a widely used survey method to quantify individuals’ preferences (Ryan, 
Gerard, & Amaya-Amaya, 2008). Participants are presented with a series of choices, 
usually between two goods described by the same attributes but differing in their 
attribute levels. By observing respondents’ preferred choices, researchers can infer 
how the value of the competing options is determined by the attributes of the prod-
uct. We carried out a DCE in which all 750 respondents had to complete 14 choice 
sets consisting of two competing healthcare interventions of which they were told 
that only one could be subsidized (completely) by the government. We described 
the health programmes in terms of seven attributes: effectiveness of the programme, 
severity of the illness, when health benefits are expected to occur (timing), possibil-
ity of adverse effects from the intervention, age group of patients, link between dis-
ease and patients’ lifestyle and the curative or preventive nature of the programme 
(see the first column in Table 3). In all other respects (e.g. costs), both programmes 
were equal. These seven attributes were chosen because they represent salient, 
generic dimensions of health care, comprising a wide range of possible healthcare 
programmes. The attributes that are most relevant to our hypotheses were effective-
ness, timing, curative or preventive type and patients’ age group. Our expectation 
was that respondents differing in their LOT-R score will attach a different impor-
tance to these attributes in their choices which healthcare programme to subsidize.
“Appendix A” shows one of the 42 choice sets that we constructed (14 per 
respondent, three survey versions, in total 10,500 choice observations (14 * 750)). 
The full descriptive results of the DCE and its conclusions for all attributes regard-
less of LOT-R are summarized elsewhere (Luyten, Kessels, Goos, & Beutels, 2015).
Other Variables in the Survey
Background information collected from respondents included their age, sex, height, 
weight (to calculate the body mass index), province, language, professional group, 
educational attainment, household size, age of youngest family member (indicat-
ing whether respondents have children as well as their age), experience as healthcare 
worker, smoking status and experience with severe illness (personal or within the fam-
ily). Respondents also provided self-assessments of their health through a standardized 
health-related quality of life instrument, the EQ-5D-5L (Herdman et al. 2011).
Statistical Analysis
We assessed the internal consistency of the LOT-R using Cronbach’s alphas and 
described the correlation between the LO, OPT and PES scores using Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficients. We constructed multiple linear regression equations to identify 
significant associations between LO, OPT and PES and the other respondent char-
acteristics surveyed (see “Psychometric Properties of and Variables Associated with 
LOT-R” section). We analysed the relationship between the DCE data and the three 
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LOT-R scores using a multinomial logit model (MNL), also called McFadden’s con-
ditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) (see “Associations Between Dispositional 
Optimism and Preferences for Priority-Setting” section). This model allows assess-
ing the relative weight of each of the seven attributes in predicting a choice, but also, 
by adding an interaction term—for instance with LO—it allows assessing whether 
respondents who differ in LO also differ in their valuation of the attributes. To con-
trol for confounding via other respondent variables associated with LO, OPT and 
PES, we also added interactions with these other variables in the model. In “Appen-
dix B”, we provide further information about the MNL model.
Results
Psychometric Properties of and Variables Associated with LOT‑R
Figure  2 summarizes the LO, PES and OPT variables using boxplots. LO values 
ranged from 8 to 30 and PES and OPT values from 3 to 15. Our sample had an 
average (and median) life orientation score of 20. Respondents scored higher on the 
OPT than on the PES scale. The average (and median) optimism score was 11; the 
average (and median) pessimism score was 9. The internal consistency of the three 
variables was acceptable [Cronbach’s α = 0.75 (LO), 0.78 (PES) and 0.72 (OPT)]. 
A factor analysis clearly indicated OPT and PES as two unique factors (describing 
about 67% of the variation). The OPT score correlated weakly with the three pessi-
mistic items (between 0.24 and 0.30), and the PES score correlated weakly with the 
optimistic items (between − 0.36 and − 0.17).
Results from multiple linear regression analysis (see Table 2) revealed that five 
variables were positively associated with a higher LO score: a higher EQ-5D-5L 
score, being older, non-smoker, a university degree and having a relatively younger-
aged youngest household member. Higher OPT scores (optimistic items only) are 
associated with higher EQ-5D-5L scores, older age and having a younger-aged 
youngest household member. Higher PES scores are associated with lower EQ-
5D-5L scores, younger age, smoking and having no or only a lower secondary edu-
cation degree.
Fig. 2  Boxplots of LO, PES and 
OPT scores (N = 750)
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Associations Between Dispositional Optimism and Preferences 
for Priority‑Setting
We estimated three models, shown in Table 3. Model I is the basic model of the 
DCE analysis that best describes the average preference of the sample, quantifying 
the extent to which the utility of an intervention (or, in other words, the respondent’s 
choice) depends on the seven attributes of the intervention [see (Luyten et al. 2015) 
for further discussion]. As can be inferred from the largest estimates (in magnitude) 
of the levels of each attribute, the average respondent’s choice can mainly be pre-
dicted on the basis of the patient’s age and lifestyle, followed by concerns about 
effectiveness and severity of illness. Models II and III focus on the link between 
these priority-setting preferences and respondents’ LOT-R scores. Introducing the 
LO variable in Model II in interaction with each of the seven attributes, we found 
that it interacts significantly with two attributes: ‘patient’s age’ (p = 0.07) and ‘type 
of intervention’ (p = 0.01). However, using the OPT and PES subscales instead of 
the complete LO scale revealed that the OPT variable does not interact with any of 
the attributes, whereas the PES variable interacts with the same attributes ‘patient’s 
age’ (p < 0.01) and ‘type of intervention’ (p < 0.01) with which LO interacts (see 
Model III). Because OPT and PES were identified as only weakly correlated clusters 
of which only PES interacted with the DCE attributes, we focus the rest of our anal-
ysis on PES instead of LO. However, this does not necessarily mean that we only 
investigate pessimism as the separation between optimism and pessimism may be 
a mere measurement artefact. The interactions with PES remained significant when 
we controlled for the effect of the respondent variables that are associated with PES 
Table 2  Variables associated with an individual’s LOT-R score
NS means that the variable is non-significant at the 5% level
Variables that we also investigated but were found to be non-significant at the 5% level are the following: 
gender, province, occupational status, language, experience as healthcare worker, personal experience 
with severe illness, experience with severe illness in the family, respondent’s body length and respond-
ent’s weight
LO OPT PES
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate p value
EQ-5D-5L score 5.7778 < 0.0001 3.3713 < 0.0001 − 2.5052 < 0.0001
Respondent age 0.0485 < 0.0001 0.0286 < 0.0001 − 0.0138 0.0096
Smoking status
 Yes − 0.4975 0.0005 NS NS 0.4593 < 0.0001
 No 0.4975 0.0005 NS NS − 0.4593 < 0.0001
Level of education
 None or lower secondary education − 0.6833 0.0062 NS NS 0.5572 0.0005
 Higher secondary education − 0.1865 0.3529 NS NS 0.1791 0.1623
 Higher non-university degree 0.0752 0.6997 NS NS − 0.1374 0.2685
 (Post-)university degree 0.7946 0.0022 NS NS − 0.5989 0.0003
Age youngest household member − 0.0157 0.0276 − 0.0095 0.0272 NS NS
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(EQ-5D-5L, age, education and smoking status), indicating an independent relation-
ship between pessimism and preferences for age-based priority-setting and preven-
tion versus cure. As indicated by the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics in Table 3, 
demonstrating the predictive power of the attributes and attributes’ interactions, we 
see that the interactions with PES are substantial. The predictive power of the PES 
interactions was 12% for PES * age (LR Chi-square = 21) and 5% for PES * type (LR 
Chi-square = 10) as compared to the predictive power of the lifestyle attribute, i.e. 
the attribute with highest predictive power in Model III (LR Chi-square = 184). As 
shown in Fig. 3, the most influential attribute (based on the LR test) is the patient’s 
health-related lifestyle, which is about twice as important as the intervention’s effec-
tiveness and about four times as important as the patient’s age and severity of ill-
ness. Among the least important attributes (or attribute interactions) are adverse 
effects, the intervention’s type and the PES interactions with patient’s age and type, 
where the former has more impact than the latter. Time span is the attribute that 
is least important. Model III in Table  3 shows that the main effects and the PES 
interaction effects with ‘Age of Patient’ are of opposite sign. The same holds for the 
main effects and the PES interaction effects with ‘Type of Intervention’. To assess 
whether the overall effects disappear when the main and PES interaction effects are 
combined for ‘Age of Patient’ or ‘Type of Intervention’, we tested for their signifi-
cance. We found that the main and interaction effects are jointly significant at a 5% 
level for both attributes, illustrating that they do not cancel each other out.
In terms of model interpretation, the following example can be instructive to 
assess the effect size of the PES interactions. When asked to choose between (1) a 
curative healthcare programme for 0–10 year olds with 100% effectiveness, no side 
effects, for a serious disease with no link with lifestyle occurring within a year, and 
(2) the exact same programme targeted at 80–90 instead of 0–10 year olds, someone 
with a maximal pessimism score has a marginal probability of choosing the younger 
patient group over the older one of 55%. Someone with minimal pessimism will 
have a chance of choosing the youngest group of 88%. Regarding the interaction 
between PES and type, when asked to choose between a curative healthcare pro-
gramme for 30–50 year olds with 100% effectiveness and no side effects, for a severe 
disease with no link with lifestyle occurring within a year and (2) the exact same 
Fig. 3  Importance of the seven 
attributes and their significant 
interactions with PES (Model III 
in Table 3) to the social value of 
a healthcare programme relative 
to the most important attribute 
‘Lifestyle of Patient’, the impor-
tance of which is set to 100
Timespan
PES*Type
Type
PES*Age of Patient
Adverse Effects
Severity of Illness
Age of Patient
Effectiveness
Lifestyle of Patient
0 20 40 60 80 100
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programme that is preventive instead of curative, someone with maximal pessimism 
will have 45% chance of preferring the preventive programme. Someone with mini-
mal pessimism will have a 60% chance of preferring the preventive programme.
We found no difference in optimists’ and pessimists’ views on priority-setting 
when it comes to the criteria of the programme’s effectiveness, health-related life-
style, severity of illness or risk of adverse effects.
Figure 4 shows the relation between respondents having different PES scores and 
the different utilities they attribute to health programmes according to the recipi-
ent’s age (Panel A) or the preventive or curative nature of the programme (Panel B). 
The solid lines indicate the main effect (for a PES score of zero), showing younger 
age groups taking priority over older ones, and prevention over cure. The dashed 
lines indicate how this main effect changes when we add the interaction with the 
respondent’s PES score. The higher the respondent’s PES score, the more the bonus 
for interventions in young people diminishes and the more equal the prioritization 
of different age groups becomes. The more pessimistic the respondent, the greater 
cure will be valued, and the lower the level of pessimism, the higher the utility of 
prevention. A PES score of ten represents a point of indifference, with scores below 
preferring prevention and scores above preferring cure.
Discussion
It is widely acknowledged that decisions to prioritize or deprioritize health care 
should, in one way or another, take into account social values. A wide body of 
research has emerged that investigates how people think about setting limits to 
health care. Typically, studies use samples that are representative of a population in 
terms of basic, socio-demographic characteristics such as age or gender but a sam-
ple could be non-representative in many more ways. In this study, we explored the 
influence of personality as a source of heterogeneity in how people want priorities 
to be set and potentially bias in how samples are recruited. We investigated whether 
A B
Fig. 4  Marginal utility values for the levels of the attributes ‘Age of Patient’ (a) and ‘Type of Interven-
tion’ (b) in interaction with respondents’ pessimism scores (PES, dashed lines) and as main effects only, 
independent of PES (solid lines)
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differences in the personality trait of dispositional optimism translated into different 
views on how to set healthcare priorities. Our general hypothesis that dispositional 
optimism matters was confirmed, but not fully in the way we expected.
On the one hand, respondents who had a more negative outlook on the future 
were indeed less likely to favour prevention over cure (with cure even being more 
desirable for very pessimistic individuals) and had a lower willingness to prioritize 
younger generations (e.g. through age-weighting of health benefits). These find-
ings are in line with those from other studies. As hypothesized in the “Dispositional 
Optimism” section, studies showing that pessimists have a less proactive problem-
solving attitude indeed suggest a lower appreciation of prevention. This is also 
confirmed in research showing that pessimists are less prevention-oriented when it 
comes to their own health behaviours [see e.g. (Radcliffe & Klein, 2002; Scheier 
et al. 1999; Taylor et al. 1992)]. In our survey, we also observed that pessimists were 
more likely to smoke. The finding regarding age-based priority-setting is compatible 
with the view that pessimists expect a worse future for themselves. Many studies 
indeed document that pessimists face a less healthy old age than optimists and need 
more health care [see e.g. (Carver et  al. 2010; Carver & Scheier, 2014; Brissette 
et al. 2002; Carver et al. 2003; Macleod & Conway, 2005)].
On the other hand, we did not find any relationship between levels of disposi-
tional optimism and time preference, as indicated by a non-significant interaction 
between respondents’ dispositional optimism and the timing attribute in the DCE. 
Also, although our initial expectation was that optimists would be more in favour of 
a differentiation according to (cost-)effectiveness because of their easier disengage-
ment from goals with unfavourable odds, no effect was found in our DCE regarding 
the effectiveness of health programmes. Moreover, another noteworthy finding was 
that the effect of optimism was driven by the pessimism items: the pessimistic items 
and not the optimistic ones mattered. As mentioned in the Methods section, there is 
an ongoing debate about the dimensionality of the LOT-R. Whereas factor analyses 
have often revealed two separate dimensions, hereby providing statistical arguments 
for why our variables PES and OPT may diverge, scholars have also argued that the 
divergence between both constructs may have methodological reasons. Item word-
ing and valence may explain different effects of pessimism and optimism scales (see 
e.g. (McPherson & Mohr, 2005; Kam & Meyer, 2012). Apart from methodological 
reasons and statistical observations, however, the literature does not provide many 
conceptual arguments for why the concepts of pessimism and optimism are differ-
ent and why different effects should be expected for PES and OPT. The fact that we 
observe effects for PES yet not for OPT may therefore give an indication of concep-
tual differences between OPT and PES, but it may also be explained by the question 
wording of both scales.
To our knowledge, our study is the first to establish a relation between personal-
ity and how people set priorities in health care. Yet our study also has several limi-
tations. Although dispositional optimism is a well-established individual difference 
in the literature, it is likely entangled with other dispositional variables. Our study 
1 3
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only allowed controlling for a limited number of more common factors such as age, 
education or health. Future studies could explore (interactions with) other personal-
ity variables. Also, we surveyed our respondents on a complex topic, in a single 
recording. Although our sample was broadly representative of the Belgian popu-
lation according to usual demographics, we recruited respondents from an online 
panel, excluding those who are younger than 18 and older than 75 years. Member-
ship to the panel, as we have discussed, may be associated with unobservable char-
acteristics. Moreover, there are general criticisms against using DCEs to elicit social 
preferences (Bryan & Dolan, 2004). Future studies could use more longitudinal and 
experimental study designs in which the consistency of the results can be assessed 
and where optimism can be manipulated in a treatment and control group. This can 
provide meaningful insights into how optimism or pessimism can be (transiently) 
stimulated and whether this leads to higher or lower support for particular forms 
of health care. Use of qualitative methods to understand the motivations behind 
respondents’ choices can also be insightful. However, notwithstanding these limi-
tations, we think that our results and suggested explanations open up possibilities 
for further research. Although we acknowledge that selecting representative sam-
ples based on personality can be impractical or even unrealistic, our results do call 
for more discussion on how to understand the representativeness of social values 
studies.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Dr. Michael Shiner and two anonymous reviewers for their com-
ments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
Authors’ Contributions JL, PD and PB framed the research question and set up the experiment. RK and 
PG designed the experiment. RK and JL analysed the data. All authors were involved in the writing of 
the text.
Funding The authors acknowledge funding from the Research Foundation—Flanders (FWO, Pro-
ject Numbers G098911N and G043815N, and Roselinde Kessels’ postdoctoral fellowship) and Pfizer’s 
European HTAcademy prize competition (2011) and the Antwerp Study Centre for Infectious Diseases 
(ASCID) at the University of Antwerp. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and 
analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Ethical Approval All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance 
with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Hel-
sinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
Ethical Standards The Committee for Medical Ethics of the University of Antwerp reviewed the study 
protocol, the questionnaire and the information letter for participants and approved them on 16 March 
2015. The market research company Ipsos conducted the survey and provided the responses for analysis 
in anonymous form only.
 Social Justice Research
1 3
Appendix A: Example of a Choice Set
Medical interventions A and B are exactly equally expensive, and they apply to a 
similar number of patients. If you were forced to make a choice, which of both inter-
ventions should be reimbursed by the government? To make it easier for you, we 
have highlighted in yellow the characteristics that differ between both interventions. 
There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your opinion.
A B
What type of intervention is it? Curative (meant to cure patients who 
are ill)
Preventive (meant 
to prevent healthy 
persons from 
becoming ill)
How big is the probability of success of 
the intervention?
2 in 3 is successful Always successful
How often do adverse effects occur? Often Often
How severe is the illness for which the 
intervention is developed?
Not lethal, but everyone who gets the 
disease will experience a severe and 
lasting reduction in quality of life
Lethal, everyone who 
gets the disease 
will die from it
Does the patient cause the disease 
through his or her own lifestyle?
Not at all Not at all
How long does it take before the patient 
becomes ill/shows signs/symptoms 
of illness?
Within a year Within a year
At what age does the patient become 
ill?
0–10 years 40–50 years
Your preference ◘ ◘
Appendix B: MNL Model
Formally, the MNL model employs random utility theory which describes the utility 
that a respondent attaches to intervention j (j = 1, 2) in choice set s (s = 1, …, 14) as 
the sum of a systematic and a stochastic component:
In the systematic component, 퐱′js훃, 퐱js is a vector containing the attribute levels of 
intervention j in choice set s. Additionally, in our analysis, this vector includes the 
interactions between the attribute levels and the LOT-R score or any other respond-
ent variable under investigation. The vector β is the vector of parameter values indi-
cating the importance respondents attach to the different attribute levels and inter-
actions. The stochastic component 휀js is the error term capturing the unobserved 
sources of utility. Under the assumption that the error terms are independently and 
identically Gumbel distributed, the MNL probability that a respondent chooses 
intervention j in choice set s is
Ujs = 퐱
�
js훃 + 휀js.
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To estimate the parameter vector β, we used a maximum likelihood estimation 
approach, which maximizes the probability of obtaining the responses from the 
selected data sample. A positive estimate has a positive effect on the total utility, 
whereas a negative estimate has a negative effect. We computed the overall signifi-
cance of the attributes and interactions by means of likelihood ratio (LR) tests. Such 
tests evaluate the difference in goodness of fit between nested models. More specifi-
cally, they compare the goodness of fit of an unrestricted or full model to a restricted 
model in which one or more parameters have been set to zero.
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